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Abstract 
Background: Lebanon is a source country of migration; it is an exporter of human 
resources, which goes mainly to the Gulf States. Given that the Gulf States’ bilateral relations 
with Lebanon have been deteriorating since the onset of the Syrian crisis, it is easy to see that 
there may be serious negative impacts on the wellbeing of the estimated 400,000 Lebanese 
expats in the Gulf States. In order to see if this is so, we conducted a survey of Lebanese 
working in the GCC, asking whether the  weakening bilateral relations between the GCC and 
Lebanon was having a negative effect on their wellbeing. This research turns on the 
hypotheses  that a), bilateral relations can be affected by population mobility and, in turn, that 
population mobility is affected by bilateral relations; b), when bilateral relations deteriorate 
between home and host countries, it negatively affects immigrants; and c), there is a clear 
correlation between bilateral relations and migrant wellbeing. Given the scarcity of data on 
residents and migrants in Lebanon, we explored our hypotheses using convenience sampling 
through social media, mainly Facebook and LinkedIn. Since Lebanese expatriates working in 
the Gulf countries are the ones most likely to be affected by the crisis, they were the focus of 
this research. To test the hypotheses, we used multiple methodologies and harnessed 
triangulated between literature on migrants, a media review, and our survey questionnaire. 
Our target population for the survey questionnaire consisted of all Lebanese working in the 
Gulf States. The questionnaire asked this cohort about their gender, religious affiliation and 
their origins by province in Lebanon; whether or not they were concerned over the 
deteriorating relations; whether they had made contingency plans should they be deported; 
and how they assessed the importance of the GCC to Lebanon. By triangulating with the 
literature and media review, we used our responses to obtain additional insights and relevant 
contextual information. In conclusion, we offer three findings:  
a)  When bilateral relations deteriorate between home and host countries, it  negatively 
affects immigrants;  
b)  There is a clear correlation between bilateral relations and migrant wellbeing; and  
c) Bilateral relations can be affected by population mobility and, in turn, that  population 
mobility is affected by bilateral relations.  
Given these findings, we claim that Lebanon urgently needs to devise a policy that protects its 
long-term interest with the GCC and to formulate a comprehensive national emigration 
policy. Lebanon is distinguished by the high degree of skilled human capital it generates and 
exports, accounting for one quarter of its Gross Domestic Product. Given the size and 
importance of this factor, Lebanon should therefore deal wisely with the situation before it 
metastasizes. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The long-standing special bilateral relations between the Gulf States and Lebanon are 
undergoing some serious tensions. These tensions are now threatening to deteriorate a 
relationship that has always been fraternal, strong, and advantageous to both sides. One of the 
more important dimensions of this relationship has been the contribution of Lebanese 
expatriates to the development of the GCC countries, which has in turn spurred Lebanon’s 
Gross Domestic Product. 1 These tensions are occurring in the rapidly changing geopolitical 
milieu of the Middle East since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’ and, in particular, since the 
onset of the Syrian crisis. The tensions intensified as the Syrian conflict divided the region 
into two camps along Islamic sectarian lines – Syria, Iran and Hezbollah in one camp, and the 
rest of the Middle Eastern countries with Turkey in the opposite camp (Helfont 2013).  The 
tensions between the GCC and Lebanon mounted as Syria’s allies in Lebanon, especially 
Hezbollah, threw themselves into a supportive role for Assad’s regime and Lebanon failed to 
adhere to its self-declared “disassociation policy”, enshrined in  the Baabda Declaration, with 
regard to turmoil in the region, particularly the conflict in Syria.  
 The Baabda Declaration is an agreement among various Lebanese leaders from the 8th 
of March2 and the 14th of March alliances3 that came about as a result of the National 
Dialogue called for by President Michel Suleiman on June 11, 2012. The Declaration, which 
is composed of 17 articles, calls, in Article 12, for Lebanon to be neutral in regard to political 
polarization and regional and international conflicts, in order to spare the country the negative 
ramifications of intervention in regional crises. Remaining neutral is seen as a way of 
protecting Lebanon’s supreme interest, national unity and civil peace (Re’asat Al Jamhouriat 
2012). However, Article 12 was overtly breached by Hezbollah in the current Syrian crisis, 
and consequently by other Islamic fundamental groups in the country. 
 Due to the interference of certain groups in Lebanon in Syria, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council addressed a letter to President Suleiman that was delivered by the Gulf Corporation 
Council’s Secretary-General Abdel Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani. In the letter, the GCC 
expressed its “extreme concerns” over Lebanon’s inability to apply the Baabda Declaration 
and its self avowed disassociation policy to its domestic parties and groups. In order to give 
further weight to the letter and show solidarity among the GCC countries in this matter, Mr. 
                                                          
1 Migration from Lebanon to the oil-producing countries began in the 1950 and increased between 1960 and 
1970, when the emerging GCC markets desperately needed unskilled and skilled manpower in various sectors of 
their economies (Labaki 1992).  The wars that ravaged Lebanon after  1975  forced more Lebanese toward 
migration particularly to the oil-producing countries in the MENA region, where their labor is well paid and the 
language and cultural mores present no large barriers. Lacking a large educated work force,  the GCC have made 
up for it by hunting down brains and arms all over the world. Lebanon, which has been repeatedly buffeted by  
political and security turmoil,  can supply the GCC with  highly qualified and exceedingly adaptable human 
resources. The expatriate Lebanese, in turn, repatriate much of their earnings to Lebanon.  . It is common 
knowledge that the Lebanese were among the first to have expatriated to the Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, especially because of their high standard of education (Al-Ostad 1986) and because migration 
has been part of Lebanon’s  collective psyche, arising from Lebanon’s old merchant traditions.  Being educated, 
adaptable, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural, Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf held key positions and were able 
from the onset to leverage their human capital into becoming indispensible elements of  the economic growth 
and cultural development of the GCC countries. In his article on the Lebanese to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, 
Marwan Maaouia wrote that in terms of job occupation, the Lebanese migrants in the GCC “tended to spread 
fairly evenly in different sectors…” and were in their majority educated workers “in the high salary bracket” 
(Maaouia 1992).  In her article, Choghig Kasparian reported that a “multinational leader in the field of 
transportation and computer solutions with a regional office for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Indian 
subcontinent stated in 2008 “that 35% of the directorship positions in the Gulf countries are occupied by 
Lebanese” (Kasparian 2008). 
2 The March 8 Alliance is a coalition of various political parties in Lebanon that includes  Hezbollah, the Free 
Patriotic Movement, and the Amal Movement among other political groups. 
3 The March 14 Alliance is a coalition of various political parties in Lebanon that includes the Lebanese Forces, 
the Kataeb Party and the Mustaqbal Party, among other political groups and individuals. 
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Al Zayani was accompanied by the ambassadors to Lebanon of the GCC member states, i.e. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Oman. 
 The GCC’s muscular letter was the result of reports that Hezbollah was increasing its 
military involvement on the side of Assad’s regime against the Free Syrian Army in Syria. In 
addition a criticism by General Michel Aoun of the 8th of March coalition of Bahrain over 
Bahraini protesters was considered interference in the domestic affairs of the country and was 
condemned by members of the GCC. Bahraini Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments, Sheikh Khalid bin Ali al-Khalifa went on record as claiming that Hezbollah’s 
“radical ideology” posed a threat to Gulf stability (Naharnet Newsdesk 2012). It was reported 
that the letter indicated that the Council “looks [to Lebanon] to abide by the [disassociation] 
policy in words and actions in order to prevent placing Lebanon's security and stability at risk 
or affect the interests of its people and their security” (The Daily Star March 05 2013). 
 At the heart of these tensions is the obsessive concern of the GCC States with security 
and internal social order. The GCC countries heavily depend on foreign labor, be they 
unskilled, semi-skilled or highly skilled, to maintain their economic growth and sustain their 
high standard of living. Because immigrants can and have been used by their countries of 
origin, by interest groups and by their host countries to advance political and ideological 
agendas (Casltes and Miller 2009), they are increasingly seen as carriers of potential threats.  
 Migration and security have become intertwined since 9/11 and its aftermath. 
Migration issues are now matters of both international political negotiation and national 
security policies engaging the attention of heads of states and key ministries involved in 
defense, internal security, and foreign relations (Weiner M. (1993). 
 Due to the present geopolitical context in the Middle East, the GCC-Lebanon relations 
are currently influenced mainly by the following concerns: a) national and regional security; 
b) the Sunni-Shia conflict; c) the Iran-GCC conflict over their domains of influence in the 
Middle East; and d) the role of Hezbollah in the regional affairs. These concerns are the 
causes of divergence in the bilateral relations between the GCC, the individual Gulf States 
and Lebanon. Consequently, security measures and national interests have become the main 
determinants of the GCC-Lebanon relations, especially when dealing with the issue of 
‘suspicious’ Lebanese expatriates.  
 In the subsequent section II, we contextualize the strained bilateral relations between 
the GCC and Lebanon by chronicling the most meaningful and famous incidents from 2009 
until 2013. In section III, we review Bilateral Relations and Immigration, and in section IV, 
we summarize the methods used to collect the opinion of the Lebanese expatriates in the 
GCC. Section V presents the results of the analysis. Section VI presents our conclusions. 
 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DETERIORATING BILATERAL RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE GCC AND LEBANON 
 The GCC letter mentioned above came about as the result of a series of events that, in 
all, display the growing division between Lebanon and the nations of that region. Consider the 
following most important public incidents between 2009 and 2013 as symptomatic of how 
affairs have escalated over time:  
 Between May and October of 2009, 45 Lebanese Shiites had either been denied re-
entry visas or had been asked to leave the UAE, for “security” related reasons. However, 
some of the deportees accused the security services in the UAE of trying to coerce them into 
spying on their compatriots and on Hezbollah on threat of deportation (NowLebanon 
(2009). Others argued that the deportation was a reaction to the 2008 incidents when on the 7th 
of May a so-called civil disobedience movement backed by the 8th of March movement led to 
an attempt by Hezbollah to take over West Beirut (International Crisis Group 2008). 
 In March 2011, a GCC diplomat serving in London said that the GCC has received 
from the Bahraini, French and US intelligence information confirming the fact that Hezbollah 
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and the Revolutionary Guards members were among those participating in the demonstrations 
taking place in Bahrain and in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia (Al Muharrer 2011). The 
GCC countries were planning to collaboratively expel all Lebanese Shiites from the Gulf in 
the wake of statements made by Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in which he 
supported the Shiite-led demonstrations in Manama. The GCC condemned Nasrallah’s 
statement, holding the Lebanese government responsible for any consequences arising from 
these antagonistic statements, especially as regards the fate of the Lebanese Shiite expatriate 
community in the GCC. These statements led to the perception among the GCC leaders that 
the Lebanese presence threatens their national security.  The GCC diplomat further stated that 
this condemnation preludes the deportation of thousands of Lebanese Shiites from the Gulf 
(Al Muharrer 2011). 
 In April 2011, Kuwait followed suit and expelled Lebanese Shiites from its territory. 
In a public statement Kuwaiti MP Mohammad Barak al-Muttayir called on the security 
agencies of Kuwait and other Gulf States to blacklist all Lebanese, Syrian, and Iranian 
nationals expelled from Bahrain. Muttayir told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Seyassah that the 
agencies should “make a list of names, photos, and fingerprints of Lebanese, Syrian, and 
Iranian persons expelled from Bahrain after they were proven to be involved in inciting events 
in the kingdom.” He also went further on to call upon immediate discontinuation of Iranian, 
Syrian, and Lebanese organizations, and immediate surveillance of these country’s 
businessmen, especially those who hold important positions or are privy to sensitive 
information (NowLebanon 2011). 
 In April 2011, the Bahrain security forces expelled 16 Lebanese, 14 of them Shiite 
Muslims, after dismissing them from their posts and revoking their residency permits. 
Furthermore, Lebanese with GCC residency, which permits their holder the entry into any 
GCC country, were turned away at the Bahraini customs. The deportations were, however, 
suspended following high level Lebanese government interference and reassurances from the 
Lebanese government that it supports the stability of Bahrain and that the Lebanese 
expatriates in Bahrain will respect the sovereignty of the State (Zawaya 2011). 
 UAE, however, resumed its expulsion of l Lebanese from its territory. A total of 9 
Lebanese from a Bekaa Village, Yehmor, were forced to leave within 15 days of the 
expulsion notice. The deportees have said that the security agents in the UAE have orally 
asked them to disclose information on Hezbollah, which, they maintain; they don’t have 
(Mohsen 2012). 
 In May 2012, officials in the UAE said that they perceived Shiites as supporters of 
Hezbollah. On June 6 and 7, 2012, 1,000 Lebanese were slated for expulsion from the UAE 
(The Daily Star June 06 2012). The President of the Republic of Lebanon Michel Sleiman 
visited the UAE to discuss the relationship of the two states, saying that he would try to get to 
the bottom of the reasons behind the decision in order to resolve the matter in cooperation 
with Emirati officials (The Daily Star June 06 2012). In turn, President Michel Sleiman 
received a pledge from leaders in the UAE to review recent measures to expel Lebanese 
nationals, according to sources close to Baabda Palace (The Daily Star June 07 2012). 
 The Lebanese in Qatar are anxious that their fate will follow that of the Lebanese in 
the UAE. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants visited Qatar, which created an 
environment of satisfaction and contentment for the Lebanese Expatriates (AsSafir 2012).    
 In December 2012, the UAE foreign ministry renewed its travel warning to Lebanon, 
advising its citizens “to avoid nonessential travel to Lebanon” … “as a result of the difficult 
and sensitive political circumstances in sisterly Lebanon” (Wehbe M. 2013). 
 In February 2013, 125 Lebanese (majority Shiites) in the United Arab Emirates were 
informed that they must leave the country within one week or risk having their properties 
expropriated. However the Lebanese responded that they have not committed any violation 
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against the law or the Emirati government, and sought recourse in the courts (AlMonitor 
2013). 
 In March 2013, there were reports that the GCC was planning to deport 2000 
Lebanese over their links with Hezbollah. A diplomat quoted by Al-Seyassah newspaper 
stated that, even people who are affiliated with parties who are allied with Hezbollah would 
be denied visas, while those working in the GCC will be deemed persona non grata. Lists 
were said to have been drafted that would officially ban certain Lebanese political figures 
from entering GCC countries due to their hostility and interference in the countries’ internal 
affairs (Trade Arabia March 09 2013). There are also talks in the GCC general secretariat to 
slash the number of flights bound to Lebanon by half. Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait 
are reportedly lobbying strenuously to have the Arab League convene a meeting at the end of 
March to freeze Lebanon's membership. According to the same diplomat, the Arab states 
intend to ask the Lebanese president and prime minister to sack Foreign Minister Adnan 
Mansour, who voiced pro-Assad stance in a recent ministerial meeting in Cairo. Mansour took 
it upon himself to demand the reinstatement of the Assad regime in the Arab League in order 
to help find a political solution to the conflict in the country; his was the single voice that 
went against the otherwise unanimous decision of the Arab League’s members (The Daily 
Star March 05 and 06 2013).  
 In August 2012, a Kuwaiti national was kidnapped in Lebanon by unknown abductors 
in the village of Howsh al-Ghanam in the Bekaa valley. Although, the abduction was 
presumed to be apolitical, Kuwait and several other Gulf states consequently ordered their 
nationals to leave Lebanon in the face of potential threats (Al Jazeera  2012). 
 However, the key event signaling the deterioration of the relations between the GCC 
and Lebanon came in a letter addressed to the President of the Republic in March 2013, in 
which the  GCC voiced its “extreme concerns” that Lebanon was failing to abide by its self-
avowed disassociation policy toward regional events. The council,” the letter stated, “looks to 
[Lebanon] to abide by the policy in words and actions in order to prevent placing Lebanon's 
security and stability at risk or affect the interests of its people and their security.” President 
Sleiman, who welcomed the GCC delegation, which consisted of all the GCC ambassadors to 
Lebanon, reaffirmed his determination to make certain that Lebanese parties abided by the 
disassociation policy (The Daily Star March 05 2013). 
 Unconfirmed information circulated that the letter mentioned previously insinuated 
that failing to comply with the self-declared disassociation might jeopardize the GCC-
Lebanese relations and as a consequence have implications on the fate of around 400,000 
Lebanese expatriate employment and businesses in the various countries of the Gulf.4  
 In May 2013, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the UAE asked citizens holding 
diplomatic, special or regular passports not to travel to the Lebanese Republic given the 
insecure situation in country. They have declared that holders of diplomatic passports have to 
obtain prior approval to travel and specify the limited period they desire to stay for special 
cases only. Regular passport holders are required to fill out a form at the airport clarifying that 
they bear their own responsibility for coming to Lebanon (The Daily Star May 12 2013). 
After two rockets hit Beirut's Shiite southern suburb wounding four people a day after 
Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah vowed to achieve victory in neighboring Syria, the Kuwaiti 
government urged its citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible due to the unstable 
situation in the country and advised its nationals not to fly to Lebanon (the Daily Star May 26 
2013). Consequently, President Michel Sleiman urged Hezbollah to stop fighting in Syria and 
abide by the disassociation policy (Naharnet May 29 2013). 
                                                          
4 In an interview with As Safir newspaper in December 2008, Finance Minister Mohammad Chatah stated that 
about one-third of Lebanon’s workforce or about 350,000 people were working in the Gulf. However, it is 
important to note that the total number of Lebanese immigrants in the Gulf countries is based on estimates. 
Different sources claim different numbers which ranges between 124 to 600 thousand migrant. 
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 In June 2013, according to GCC chief Abdullatif al-Zayani, who was speaking to 
reporters at the end of a ministerial meeting in the Saudi city of Jeddah, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council "decided to look into taking measures against Hezbollah's interests in the member 
states.  On the other hand, Bahraini Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ghanim al-Buainain 
said that "nobody could cover up Hezbollah's actions in regional countries.” “It is a terrorist 
organization and this is how Gulf States see it," he added. However, placing Hezbollah on the 
GCC's terror list was "a technical and legal matter that needs to be further studied” (Now June 
02 2013). Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Awwad Assiri, was asked if his country 
would move to expel Lebanese citizens, but said only that the GCC decision “affects those 
who support Hezbollah” (Gulf News June 22 (2013). 
 July 2013, President Michel Sleiman and Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati 
visited Qatar to congratulate the accession of the new leader, Qatar Prince Tamim bin Hamad 
al Thani.  During the visit, President Sleiman praised the relations between Lebanon and 
Qatar. In turn, the new leader hailed the contribution of the Lebanese working in Qatar and 
promised that they would not be targeted (The Daily Star June 30 2013). 
 The 2009-2013 events have made the issue of migration from Lebanon to the GCC a 
security issue which triggered the involvement of heads of states, as well as the interference of 
high level officials (e.g. President Suleiman, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the 
Parliament on the Lebanese side and Rulers and ministers in some countries of the GCC, as 
well as the GCC’s Secretary-General), making it a grave regional and bilateral political 
matter. 
 The Gulf States have in the past threatened Lebanon by using the Lebanese expatriates 
or its influence in the Lebanon’s economy as a means of pressure.  In 2003, for instance, and 
following New TV satellite station airing a program that was critical of the Kingdom, Saudi 
Arabia “signaled to Lebanon that the economic conditions of Lebanese expatriates residing in 
the Kingdom were in jeopardy” (Salloukh 2008). Another incident took place during the US 
invasion of Iraq, when the Lebanese Foreign Minister “discussed a resolution supportive of 
Iraq; the GCC States hinted that Beirut might suffer economic consequences” (Salloukh 
2008). Anecdotal information indicates that in 1969 some of the Middle Eastern countries 
threatened to deport the then 45-60,000 Lebanese expatriates from their respective countries 
to force Lebanon to sign the fateful Cairo Agreement which legitimatized the armed 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon, allowing them to carry on their struggle against Israel. 
 The deterioration in regional and bilateral relations between Lebanon and the GCC 
states has caused uncertainty concerning potential economic sanctions, dread of deportation of 
Lebanese expatriates, and fright of closing Lebanese businesses. There are, as well, worries of 
banning Lebanese from entering the job market in the GCC states, fear of GCC investors and 
governments withdrawing deposits from Lebanese banks. Politically, among Lebanese 
officials, there is some distress over the possibility of recalling diplomatic representation. In a 
blow to Lebanon’s tourist industry, GCC countries are cautioning their nationals against travel 
to Lebanon and threatening to suspend flights to and from Beirut from their countries.  These 
threats and possibilities have created a miasma of fear among Lebanese expatriates living and 
working in the Gulf alike, which has fed back to Lebanese nationals in the homeland itself. 
 Events such as these and the growing perception by governments of the threat posed 
by certain immigrants to their security and internal social order have caused frictions in the 
bilateral relations between host and home countries. Host countries claim that they are forced 
to counteract threats posed by Lebanese Shiites by introducing policies and measures directed 
at Lebanon, aimed at the immigrant culprit profile, and even at immigration in general. Such 
measures include inter alia increased restriction of visas for the home country; growing 
scrutiny of visa applicants; increasing the hold period for visa applications; extensive border 
checks; intelligence gathering information on admitted immigrants; deportation; and 
incarceration. Whether these measures are a violation of human rights or not is immaterial 
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here.  The issue, instead, is that these measures affect the admission of individuals seeking to 
visit, invest, join their families, work, or live in these countries. Whether we like it or not, 
international migration is now part of the security nexus and will continue to be for the 
foreseeable future. 
 The following section discusses three connected topics: The securitization of 
migration; how news from home affects migrants and residents of the host country and finally 
how bilateral relations affect immigrants’ wellbeing. 
 
II. BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION 
 In the twenty-first century, cross border human migration has become a principal 
aspect of the international political environment, yet it remains under studied and under-
theorized in International Relations. International Relations (RI) have long overlooked 
international migration and its impact on relations between countries. It was not until 
migration and security collided with a bang on 9/11 and the subsequent attacks in London and 
Madrid that International Relations’ scholars began paying serious attention to the 
relationship between human mobility and International Relations.   This led to more attention 
for a paper that was published a decade prior to 9/11, Myron Weiner 1992 article, “Security, 
Stability and international Migration”. This article has gradually changed the way 
International Relations scholars viewed migration in bilateral, regional and international 
politics. In his article, Weiner, a professor of political science at MIT, asserted that migration 
is no longer the sole concern of ministries of labor or of immigration and that it has become a 
matter of “high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and 
key ministries involved in defense, internal security, and external relations” (Weiner 1992). 
Weiner was followed by Mark Miller, who stated in 1998 that the increase in diplomatic 
activities on international migration related issues, the socio-economic and trade interventions 
that are instituted to reduce migratory pressures, as well as the enactment of laws and 
regulations concerning foreigners are all indicators that policy makers are becoming aware of 
the correlations between human international mobility and security (Miller 1998). 
 In recent years, the issues around immigration have been clarified through the use of 
the security framework of the Copenhagen School of security studies, which originated  in 
Barry Buzan’s  book People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International 
Relations, first published in 1983. The Copenhagen School places particular emphasis upon 
the social aspects of security. Under this framework the literature on the ‘securitization of 
migration’ has become quite fashionable.  The Copenhagen School framework “argues that 
instead of examining security as something tangible, scholars should consider the process by 
which actors construct issues as threats to security, a process they call 'securitization'” 
(Karyotic and Patrikios 2010). 
 Conventional discourses in migration studies have constructed immigrants as posing a 
‘multi-dimensional’ threat to the host countries and communities (Lahav and Courtemanche 
2012). Some of the ‘multi-dimensional’ threats that have been identified in migration 
discourse are economic and cultural (Cohen 2001), political (Tesfaye and Mavisakalyan 
2013), national identity (IJMS 2005), sovereignty (Demo 2005), and security and terrorism 
(Ceccorulli 2009; Moens and Collacott 2008). 
 The perception that migration can host threats to national security and internal social 
order has made its way into the security agendas and national and foreign policies of not only 
developed countries, but also those in the developing and emerging economies niche. This has 
led to measures such as rigid visa policies and the keeping and sharing of databases that 
provide information on foreign nationals and their political affiliations and activities. These 
are used not only to keep out the unwanted, but also to enhance the surveillance of those who 
have been admitted in. Part of the current security strategies of countries that receive 
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immigrants or foreign labors is to use non-military, economic and political instruments as part 
of their defense mechanisms.   
 There are numerous examples of countries dealing with immigrants coming from 
countries with which the host country has public or secret hostilities or is even engaged in 
war.  The Japanese and the Germans immigrants in the USA, Canada and Australia during 
World War II are a case in point, but there are many others that demonstrate the 
transformation from normal immigrant status to “enemy aliens” or ‘hostile aliens’, which 
arises simply  by the fact that  they come from ‘enemy’ or ‘hostile’ states (Panayi 1993).  
 It has been established that poor diplomatic relations discouragingly affect 
immigrants’ wellbeing (Safi 2010). It is argued that “any deterioration in diplomatic relations 
makes it more difficult for migrants to pursue their homeland interests” (Waldinger and 
Fitzgerald 2003). Bad diplomatic relations between states noted Waldinger and Fitzgerald 
(2003) “affect the conditions under which international migrants and their descendants can 
pursue their ‘homeland’ interests. In general, a peaceful world encourages states to relax the 
security/solidarity nexus. International tension, let alone belligerence, provides the motivation 
to tighten up on those whose loyalties extend abroad” (Armstrong, 1976). The specifics of the 
relationship between particular sending and receiving states matter even more and “homeland 
loyalties extending to allies or neutrals can be tolerated easily”, however “those that link to 
less friendly, possibly hostile states are more likely to be suspect” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 
2004).   
 Furthermore, given the interconnections that arise from global telecommunications, 
immigrants and residents are no longer so cut off from what is occurring on the national, 
regional and international levels. This connectivity between sending and receiving countries is 
therefore “an inherent aspect of the migration phenomenon...” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 
2004).  
 Immigrants are principally affected by bilateral relations, be they good or bad 
diplomatic affairs.  Individuals, who are closely identified with both countries, i.e. the home 
and the host countries, can easily be either benefited or disadvantaged by good or bad 
diplomatic affairs.  
 Countries such as the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that have 
intense migratory flow and are geographically located in a volatile political environment tend 
to use migration as a trump when it comes to their own security and social order.  
 This situation makes Lebanon particularly vulnerable, as   Lebanon depends heavily 
on the GCC for the employment of its young and brightest, as well as for remittances inflow, 
tourism receipts, banking and finance, real estate, and direct investment flows. It is estimated 
that 400,000 Lebanese work in the GCC states remitting up to 58% of the total $8.2 billion 
Dollars remitted to Lebanon in 2011. As such, the total amount remitted by Lebanese come 
from the Gulf countries. The UAE was “the main source of inward remittances with 24% of 
the total in 2009, followed by Saudi Arabia with 13.5%, Qatar with 9.3%, Kuwait with 8.8%” 
(In Focus May 2011). 
 In a report published by Al-Iktissad Wal-Aamal (Economy and Business Lebanese 
Magazine) in October-November of 2012, the negative repercussions of strained relations 
between Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were illustrated by reference to 
various indices: for instance, there had been an extraordinary drop in tourism from the GCC 
countries by 45% in 2012 compared to the numbers in 2010, which couldn’t be explained by 
the economic downturn (The Daily Star November 28 2012). The report indicated that tourists 
hailing from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate and Kuwait represent 35% of the total 
number of Middle East tourism in Lebanon and about 12% of the total tourists for the year. 
Saudi tourists alone represent one fourth of total tourist spending in Lebanon. As for the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Lebanon, 75-80% of it comes from nationals of the GCC 
countries. In addition, the value of Lebanese exports to the Gulf countries accounts for an 
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average of 20% of the total export. According to the Center for Economic Studies at the 
Chamber of Commerce of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, estimated cumulative investment of the 
GCC in Lebanon for the period between 1985 and 2009 comes to $11.3 billion dollars. The 
largest share of these investments originating from Saudi Arabia ($4.8 billion dollars), 
followed by the UAE ($2.9 billion), Kuwait ($2.8 billion) (Abi Ghanem 2012). 
 As we have seen “power differentials between sending and receiving states count” 
(Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). This research aimed at answering some of the questions 
pertaining to the concerns of the Lebanese in the GCC; their sense of the importance of the 
GCC in relation to the Lebanese economy; their stance in regard to the ramifications of the 
strained relations with the GCC; their plans should the worst happen; and their suggestions as 
to how the Lebanese government should respond to the GCC countries. These questions are 
answered in a non-comprehensive survey that targeted Lebanese expatriates working in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. This research evaluates the hypotheses 
that a) when bilateral relations deteriorate between home and host countries, it negatively 
affects immigrants; b) there is a clear correlation between bilateral relations and migrant 
wellbeing; and c) bilateral relations can be affected by population mobility and, in turn, that 
population mobility is affected by bilateral relations. 
 
IV. METHODS 
 Given the scarcity of data on residents and migrants from Lebanon, we explored the 
research hypothesis using convenience sampling through social media mainly Facebook and 
LinkedIn. Since Lebanese expatriates working in the Gulf countries are the most affected by 
the crisis, it was only natural that they be the focus of this research. To test the hypotheses, we 
used multiple methodologies and triangulated our survey responses with literature and media 
reviews. The survey was undertaken between March and April of 2013 at the height of the 
crisis. The assessment was weighed via a questionnaire that was sent through emails to more 
than 1300 Lebanese working in the Gulf countries. The media review covered related events 
from 2009 until August 2013. The primary data sources were the database of the Lebanese 
Emigration Research Center, Facebook and LinkedIn. Of the 1300 questionnaires emailed, 
608 filled out the questionnaire and 457 were deemed usable, giving a high response rate of 
35%. The quantitative data reported in this research were collected from Lebanese working in 
the Gulf (N= 457), who were surveyed on the topic. Survey Monkey was used as a web-based 
survey to gather quick insights into the issue. Individuals interested in expressing their 
opinion filled out the survey anonymously.  
 In the section below, we present the findings of descriptive statistical analyses to 
address the main hypotheses. 
 
V. RESULTS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Status in the GCC 
 In regard to their status in the GCC, 81% of the respondents indicated that they were 
currently working in the GCC, 10% owning a business in the GCC and 9% looking for a job 
in the GCC.  
 
Lebanon’s Dependency on the GCC 
 The responses indicated that 74% of the respondents believe that Lebanon is very 
dependent on the GCC for employment, 67% said that it is very dependent in terms of 
tourism, 57% in terms of deposits and investments, 40% in terms of development aid relief 
(40%), while 42% and 39% of the respondents believe that Lebanon is dependent on the GCC 
for export and real estate respectively.  
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Table 3: Respondents’ response on the level of Lebanon’s economic dependency on the GCC 
Answered: 450 
Skipped: 7 
 
Very 
Dependent Dependent 
Somewhat  
Dependent 
Not  
Dependent 
Total  
Respondents 
Tourism 67.12% 294 
23.06% 
101 
7.31% 
32 
2.51% 
11 
 
438 
Relief 39.34% 168 
32.32% 
138 
24.36% 
104 
4.45% 
19 
 
427 
Real Estate 36.70% 160 
38.53% 
168 
19.72% 
86 
5.28% 
23 
 
436 
Exports 27.74% 119 
41.26% 
177 
26.34% 
113 
5.13% 
22 
 
429 
Employment 73.38% 328 
18.57% 
83 
6.04% 
27 
2.68% 
12 
 
447 
Development Aid 41.49% 178 
35.90% 
154 
19.58% 
84 
3.50% 
15 
 
429 
Deposits/Investments 55.61% 243 
31.58% 
138 
11.90% 
52 
1.83% 
8 
 
437 
 
 
Primary Concerns over the Deteriorating Relationship 
In Table 1, the respondents were asked to identify what concerned them most  
regarding the deteriorated relationship between the GCC and Lebanon. Deporting Lebanese 
working in the GCC was the main concern (87%) followed by fear of sanctioning Lebanese 
from entering the GCC (82%), worries about closing Lebanese businesses in the GCC (57%), 
nervousness about pulling out deposits from Lebanese banks (52%)and trepidation about 
banning GCC citizens from visiting Lebanon (50%). 
Table 1: Respondents’ primary concerns with regard to the GCC-Lebanon relations? 
Answered: 445 
Skipped: 12 
Numbers are rounded to the nearest percent  
Answer Choices # of Responses % of Responses 
Deporting Lebanese working in the GCC  388 87% 
Banning Lebanese from entering the GCC  366 82% 
Closing Lebanese businesses in the GCC  255 57% 
Pulling out deposits from Lebanese banks  229 52% 
Banning GCC citizens visits to Lebanon  223 50% 
Banning GCC imports from Lebanon  137 31% 
Suspending flights to and from Lebanon  169 38% 
Suspending development aid to Lebanon  167 38% 
Calling back the GCC ambassadors  69 16% 
 
 
Return or Re-migrate 
 Of the 446 who answered this question, the majority or 37% did not know what choice 
to make at the time of the survey, 22% said that they planned to return to Lebanon, 22% 
indicated that they planned to go to another country in which they hold either a citizenship or 
a permanent residency and 20% will go to another country for which they have an entry visa. 
The data indicates that of the 446 respondents only 98 persons will return to Lebanon.  
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Table 2: Respondents’ destination in worst case scenario 
Answered: 446 
Skipped: 11 
Answer Choices # of Responses % of Responses 
Return to Lebanon 100 
 
22% 
 
Go to another country from which I hold a 
citizenship or permanent residency 96 
 
22% 
 
Go to another country I have a valid visa for  87 
 
19% 
Don't know what to do 163 
 
37% 
 
 
 
 There have been many waves of Lebanese migration to the Gulf countries, of which 
three occurred during important conjunctures in the history of both countries.  The first wave 
took place prior to the 1975 war, during the height of the oil boom in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia; the second wave was the one that flowed in during the Civil War years; and the third 
was that which was ushered in after the end of the 1975 war and has continues to the present. 
This was due to economic growth and development projects in the GCC and the continued 
insecurity and economic downturn in Lebanon (Hourani 2010, 2011).  
 Choosing a destination for re-migration is not a spontaneous decision; it is done 
according to the person’s careful consideration and prioritization. Our results showed various 
factors that go into making this choice -- 36% would choose a destination that has better 
future for their families; 32% would select a place with better employment opportunities; 17% 
with better standard of living and 14% with better security.  Some Lebanese emigrants use the 
Gulf countries as a transit point or a stepping stone to permanent migration to other countries 
that provides dual citizenship such as Canada, the USA, Australia and some of the countries 
in Europe. 
 Re-migration/secondary migration is a tactic used by migrants to move from their first 
migration destination to another. In the case of the Lebanese in the Gulf States and prior to the 
GCC-Lebanon deteriorating relations, two main push elements make them re-migrate –firstly, 
citizenship is difficult to obtain in the Gulf States, and secondly, going back to Lebanon is 
problematic, due to the protracted insecurity and instability there.  Having acquired good 
educations in Lebanon and professional skills and experience in the Gulf, they have the kind 
of qualifications that are sought after in countries where citizenship acquisition is permissible. 
 The economic situation in the home country is a push factor for migration, as well as a 
deterrent to return.  Participants in the survey were asked how they would rate the current 
economic situation in Lebanon.  47% rated it as very poor, 42% rated as poor, 10% rated it as 
average and less than 1% rated it very good. 
 
Impact of Any Types of GCC Sanctions on Lebanon 
 In order to gauge the perception of figures familiar with both Lebanon and the GCC 
economies, we asked our cohort to judge what the impact of GCC sanctions on Lebanon 
might be: negligible, weak, strong, very strong or devastating. 
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Table 4: Respondents’ views on the level of impact of any type 
of sanctions by the GCC on Lebanon 
Answered: 457 
Skipped: 0 
Answer Choices Responses 
Negligible  1.75% 8 
Weak  2.63% 12 
Strong  20.79% 95 
Very Strong  33.92% 155 
Devastating  40.92% 187 
Total  457 
 
 
The majority of the respondents (41%) indicated that such sanctions will be 
devastating, followed by 34% who said that it will be very strong, 21% said it will be strong 
and only 3% and 2% indicated that it will be weak or negligible respectively. 
 
Responsibility for the Crisis between the GCC and Lebanon 
 In terms of blame, the majority of the respondents specified that they blame the 8th of 
March coalition first (79%), the Lebanese government second (76%), Syria and Iran 
respectively third (39%) and the 14th of March coalition fifth (34%). 
 
Proposed Interventions 
 In regard to suggestions to ameliorate the situation, 71% of the respondents indicated 
that the Lebanese government should reconcile with the GCC, 44% advised to conform to the 
disassociation policy.  
 
General Characteristics of Respondents 
 The data showed that of the 457 respondents 79% male and 18% female. In terms of 
religious affiliation, of the 396 who answered this questions 46% were Christians and 41% 
were Muslims (we did not ask whether they self-defined as Sunni or Shiite). In regard to the 
geographical origin of the respondents: 36% were from Mount Lebanon, 28% were from 
Beirut, 15% from the North, 14% from the South and 7% from the Bekaa. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The research has a number of limitations; the first limitation concerns the lack of a 
national minimum database on Lebanese expatriates. The second limitation is the small size of 
the sample and the short timeframe set for conducting the survey, which eliminated potential 
respondents who might have been busy or traveling. The third limitation is the fact that by not 
being able to administer the questionnaire face-to-face, we were deprived of the opportunity 
of probing the interviewees for further information.  
 Lack of compliance with the self-imposed disassociation policy compounded by the 
GCC’s heightened perception of security threats is shaking the confidence of Lebanese 
expatriates in the continuing viability of working in the Gulf.  Lebanese governments and 
policy makers should take into consideration the impact of bilateral relations on the wellbeing 
of the Lebanese emigrants or expatriates living and/or working abroad.   
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 Despite the above mentioned limitations, the research has a number of strengths. First, 
it assessed the responses of some of the Lebanese expatriates in regard to the topic at the 
height of the crisis, which allows them the privilege to share their candid feedback. Second, 
complete anonymity freed them from any self-censorship they may have felt in regard to the 
questions asked. Third, it showed how important the GCC threats are on the well-being of the 
Lebanese expatriates. Finally, since there is very little if any published literature on the impact 
of bilateral relations on the immigrants in the Gulf in general and on the Lebanese in 
particular, this research provides a groundbreaking glimpse into this phenomenon and its 
implications. 
 Based on the above findings, this study suggests that when relations deteriorate 
between home and host countries, it negatively affects immigrants. Hence, there is a clear 
correlation between bilateral relations between home and host countries and migrant welfare 
and safety. The deteriorating relationships between the GCC and Lebanon and the Gulf 
individual countries and Lebanon are affecting the wellbeing of Lebanese working in the 
GCC and alternatively the livelihood of thousands of Lebanese homeland residents who count 
on the remittances from the Lebanese expatriates in the GCC countries or the Gulf market for 
the employment of Lebanese and the Gulf countries’ economic and financial role in the 
Lebanese economy.  
 The policies of the countries of origin remain significant for the immigrants’ wellbeing 
in the host countries. Deteriorating bilateral relations between home and host countries has 
considerable effect on the immigrants. Every public event or incident that impacts the 
countries of migration has the potential to affect the wellbeing of the immigrants, an effect 
that is now magnified through the real-time environment of the internet and 
telecommunications.  Furthermore, increasingly national politics and economies are heavily 
intertwined with security, making migration into a fraught political issue. Countries are 
therefore compelled to balance security with their needs for foreign labor (Givens 2010).; thus 
“good relationships between home and host countries generate significant well-being 
externalities for those who live abroad” (Becchetti, Clark and Ricca 2011). 
 The findings of this research support the hypotheses with which we started out:  the 
deterioration of bilateral relations between home and host countries: a) negatively affects 
immigrants; b) gives us a clear correlation between bilateral relations and migrant wellbeing; 
and c) is effected by population mobility and vice versa. 
 Despite the fact that it is unlikely that the GCC would engage in the mass deportation 
of  Lebanese nationals because of the  detrimental effects this action will have on various 
sectors of their economies, Lebanon should pay attention to these bilateral relations, if for no 
other reason than it has hundreds of thousands of nationals working in the region. Hence, 
there is an urgent necessity for Lebanon to wisely adopt a policy that protects its long-term 
interest with the GCC and to formulate a comprehensive national emigration policy, 
especially as the Lebanese themselves are one of Lebanon’s main natural resources and their 
earnings and remittances the  source of one quarter of its Gross Domestic Product. Lebanon 
should therefore deal wisely with the situation before it metastasizes. 
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